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ABSTRACT
In the literature exploring IS (information systems) evaluation, practi-
tioners rarely practice what researchers preach, and researchers rarely preach
what practitioners practice. However, the unique characteristics of OA (office
automation) systems force a rethinking of the existing schism between IS
evaluative practice and research. This paper presents a model of OA evalua-
tion that integrates the perspectives of research and practice. The model sug-
gests that in certain circumstances, purely quantitative OA evaluation may be
irrelevant or destructive. Strategies for avoiding the undesirable behavioral
side-effects of OA evaluations include integrating multiple perspectives, con-
sidering unintended effects, using orthogonal measures and methods, scruti-
nizing social and decision processes, and discovering goals.

INTRODUCTION
This paper is built around a paradox. Evaluation strategies from the in-
formation systems (IS) literature are generally based upon quantitative
methodologies (e.g. Schwuchow, 1977; King and Schrems, 1978; King and Ep-
stein, 1983; Bozcany, 1983; Piepta and Anderson, 1987; Sharda, Barr, and Mc-
Donnell, 1988). However, studies of IS professionals indicate that they fre-
quently omit formal, quantitative evaluations of IS and rely instead on more
intuitive assessments of system impact (Greiner, Leitch, and Barnes, 1979;
Keen, 1981; Sprague and Carlson, 1982; Couger and Colter, 1983; Hogue and
Watson, 1984). If formal, quantitative models for IS evaluation are of value,
why are they infrequently used by their intended beneficiaries?
One explanation is that most formal models of IS evaluation are ves-
tiges of an era when the goal of assessing IS was to evaluate the realized cost
savings. With the advent of office automation (OA) 1 however, IS increasingly
impact qualitative processes in organizations such as social relationships,
leadership emergence, communication patterns, and managerial feedback pro-
cesses (Williams, 1978; Zuboff, 1982; Weick, 1985; Kiesler, 1986; Rogers, 1986).
As a result, the relevance of evaluative strategies developed primarily to as-
sess direct cost savings are increasingly suspect. Further, given that approxi-
mately 20% of U.S. businesses have adopted some form of office automation
(Uttal, 1982; Rogers 1986) assessing the impact of OA is far from an "academic"
issue.
The perspective I wish to consider in this article is that both the prac-
tice and theory of OA evaluation can be improved by a dialectic approach.
OA is herein defined as the application of electronic and electro-mechanical devices to facilitate
communications between organizational actors.
wherein descriptive and normative views of the evaluative process inform one
another (Adler, 1927; Benson, 1977; Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1987). To date,
approaches to IS evaluation have frequently been theoretical constructs bor-
rowed from reference disciplines (e.g. experimental psychology, engineering)
that ignored the context of IS, or, descriptions of existing IS practice un-
informed by relevant theory. This article seeks to inform normative theory
with descriptions of practice, and descriptions of practice with normative the-
ory. March argues for a similar approach in discussing the relationship be-
tween normative and descriptive theories of choice:
"I think there is good sense in asking how the practical imple-
mentation of theories of choice combine with the ways people
behave when they make decisions, and whether our ideas about
the engineering of choice might be improved by greater attention
to our descriptions of choice behavior." (March, 1978, p. 588).
It is worth noting that much of the theory presented herein is not new.
Its origins date to the 1950s (e.g. Blau, 1955; Merton, 1957). However, the per-
spective offered by this theory is relatively unexplored in IS. As a result, the
purpose of this article is to teach some old tricks (from social intervention and
organizational behavior research) to a new dog (OA evaluation).
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
Three principles from organizational behavior provide a conceptual
foundation for linking social intervention theories with OA evaluation prac-
tice. These are the principle of incompatibility, the distinction between high
and low evaluative methodology, and the distinction between uncertainty and
ambiguity.
The Principle of Incompatibility
The principle of incompatibility states, in essence, that as a system be-
comes more complex, it is increasingly difficult to generate statements about
the system that are both precise and significant (Zadeh, 1973; Daft and Wigin-
ton, 1979). Ultimately, a threshold is reached beyond which precision and sig-
nificance become mutually exclusive. Since human systems are among the
most complex of known systems (Boulding, 1956; Pondy and Mitroff, 1978;
Daft and Weick, 1984), significant statements about organizations must nec-
essarily contain ambiguity and inexactness to retain relevance (Daft and Wig-
inton, 1979). Similarly, assessing the impact of a complex OA system necessi-
tates the use of some imprecise, ambiguous statements if evaluation is to be
nontrivial.
High and Low Variety Evaluation Methodologies
A related distinction is the difference between low and high varietv
evaluation methodologies (Pondy, 1977; Patton, 1987). Low variety evaluation
methodologies seek to generate precise statements about organizational pro-
cesses, while sacrificing accuracy. Tools used in low variety evaluation include
traditional experimental controls, formal statistical techniques, and analytical
mathematics. Due to the principle of incompatibility, low variety evaluation
will likely detect, process, and exhibit relatively less variety in the system un-
der study, since they have a limited capacity to detect qualitative phenomena
(Daft and Wiginton, 1979). For example, the use of low variety methodologies
might lead to the conclusion that an implemented OA system had "no effect"
since there were no measurable cost savings from the system.
In contrast, higher variety evaluation methodologies seek to generate
more accurate descriptions, but contain ambiguity and imprecision. Tools used
in higher variety evaluation are primarily qualitative and are designed to de-
tect, process, and exhibit qualitative organizational phenomena, such as intan-
gible benefits and ultimate outcomes (Argyris, 1972; Child, 1972). As a result
of the use of thicker, richer measures, complex organizational processes are
more likely to be captured, understood, and explained using high variety
methodologies (Weick, 1974).
Table 1 (adapted from Douglas (1976) and Weick (1984)) provides a con-
tinuum of evaluation methodologies. The first three categories in Table 1 rep-
resent high variety evaluation methodologies. These include instrospection
(e.g. a manager writing a memo) and many forms of field research (e.g. a man-
ager asking subordinates about system effects). The last category in Table 1
consists of low variety evaluation methodologies, such as questionnaires,
mathematical models, and statistical models. To date, evaluative method-
ologies proposed for evaluating IS are primarily of low variety (e.g. King and
Schrems, 1978; Sprague and Carlson, 1982; Sharda, Barr and McDonnell,
1988), while methodologies used by IS practitioners are generally of high vari-
ety (e.g. Greiner, Leitch, and Barnes, 1979; Keen, 1981; Sprague and Carlson,
1982; Couger and Colter, 1983; Hogue and Watson, 1984).
Insert Table 1 about here
Uncertainty and Equivocality
A final principle useful in considering OA evaluative practices is the dis-
tinction between uncertainty and equivocality. Uncertainty is the absence of
information (Miller and Frick, 1949; Daft and Lengel, 1986). As information in-
creases, uncertainty decreases. The game of 20 questions illustrates uncer-
tainty and uncertainty reduction. A questioner receives yes-no answers to
questions intended to identify an unknown object as either animal, vegetable,
or mineral (Taylor and Faust, 1952; Bendig, 1953; Daft and Lengel, 1986). Un-
certainty is eliminated when the object is correctly identified. In management
tasks characterized by uncertainty, managers are able to ask questions, and
get answers that permit problem solving. Organizational processes can be
structured to reduce uncertainty through the use of rules and regulations and
through the creation of formal, structured IS (Daft and Lengel, 1986).
In contrast, equivocality involves interpreting data that is unclear, con-
flicting, or paradoxical (Weick, 1979; Daft and Macintosh, 1981). The sentence,
"I saw the man on the hill with the telescope," is equivocal: multiple inter-
pretations are possible (Simon, 1982, p. 93). Do I have the telescope, or does
the man on the hill? Is it merely on the hill and not in his hands? Managers
deal with 'men on hills with telescopes' regularly, and must make sense of
such equivocality. Daft et al. observe that in equivocal environments:
"Managers are not certain what questions to ask, and if questions
are posed there is no store of objective data to provide an answer.
(Daft, Lengel, and Trevino, 1987, p. 357)."
Fundamental to the process of managing equivocality are exchanges be-
tween managers intended to reduce equivocality and create a shared interpre-
tation that can direct future events. When facing equivocality, organizations
must enact solutions rather than discover them through data gathering activi-
ties (Weick, 1979; Daft and Weick, 1984). The process of enactment involves
exchanging subjective opinions, managing multiple perspectives, and proac-
tively shaping environments (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). Equivocality is re-
duced by managing and generating both events and interpretations of events.
Since communication between managers is essential in reducing equiv-
ocality (Weick, 1979), implementing an OA system may directly impact the or-
ganizational processes for managing equivocality and enacting solutions to
ambiguous problems (Daft, Lengel, and Trevino, 1987). OA systems are fre-
quently designed to alter communications patterns in tasks containing equivo-
cality. Neith decision support systems (DSSs) designed for individual man-
agers nor' transaction processing systems are designed to change organiza-
tional communication patterns. Individualized DSSs and transaction process-
ing systems are therefore more likely to impact organizational processes for
managing uncertainty, but not equivocality. For reasons to be discussed, the
use of evaluative methodologies appropriate for uncertainty-managing sys-
tems may lead to irrelevant or destructive evaluations of equivocality-manag-
ing systems.
OA AS SOCIAL EXPERIMENT
OA systems are social experiments2
,
similar to the implementation of a
program designed to ameliorate social problems (Rogers, 1986). Both OA sys-
tems and social programs are generally implemented in field studies without
benefit of formal experimental controls or control groups. Both are imple-
mented by purposive action that is tied to specific, frequently qualitative, ob-
jectives. The effects of both OA systems (Kling, 1980) and social programs
(Salasin, 1973; Suchman, 1977) have been demonstrated to be far-reaching and
often unanticipated.
A significant body of research, called "evaluation research" has evolved
to assess the effects of social experiments (e.g. Caro, 1971; Weiss, 1972a,
1972b; Suchman, 1974, 1977; Patton, 1987). Rogers (1986, p. 218) notes the
similarities between OA systems and social programs and suggests that evalu-
ation research is a useful paradigm for considering the impact of OA systems.
This section discusses the implications of viewing OA systems as social ex-
periments, and explores findings from evaluation research relevant to OA
evaluation.
2
" The term "social experiment" is from Suchman (1974).
A Model of OA Implementation Evaluation
Evaluations are an important component of the authority structure of
an organization (Scott, Dornbusch, Busching, and Laing, 1967; Pfeffer, 1978).
Figure 1 is a model (adapted from Suchman (1977, 1974)) that is useful in for-
mulating the problem of evaluating an implemented OA system. The introduc-
tion of OA into an organization creates multiple, measurable effects (Yj, Y£, •••
Ym) (Hedberg, Edstrom, Muller, and Wilpert, 1975; Kling, 1980). Each of these
effects may be explained by an antecedent condition (a^, ^ — am ), by the in-
troduction of the OA system (X), or by an interaction between the OA system
and an antecedent condition (X * an). No single antecedent condition is a nec-
essary and sufficient explanation for any effect. Further, measurable effects
(Y) are presumed to link to qualitative consequences (b^, D2» ... bp ), that repre-
sent the ultimate objectives or outcomes of the system. Evaluation under such
conditions requires multicausal models, that include consideration of the in-
terdependence of antecedent conditions, observed effects, and consequences
(Suchman, 1977).
Insert Figure 1 about here
To illustrate the model, consider the evaluation of a teleconferencing
system (X) designed to facilitate meetings between geographically-disbursed
engineers or executives. Such systems are currently in place at Digital Equip-
ment, AT&T (Kiesler, 1986), and NASA (Trevino, Lengel, and Daft, 1987). Po-
tentially important antecedent conditions (ams) include existing communica-
tion modes, power relationships between engineers and executives, manage-
rial roles, familiarity with communications technology, and the stated goals of
the teleconferencing system. Measurable effects (Y
n
s) might include measures
8of productivity (e.g. time required to make a decision), process (e.g. frequency
of communications between users), and OA product (e.g. development costs,
on-going maintenance costs) (Sprague and Carlson, 1982). Consequences of the
system (bps) might include a better understanding of the business, new in-
sights, and improved communication.
Inferences of causality under such conditions must be conditional and
probabilistic, focused upon identifying contributing or precipitating factors,
rather than determining conditions. Because of the complexity and equivocal-
ity of the organizational environment (Pondy and Mitroff, 1978), effects re-
sulting from OA implementation must be considered dependent upon existing
preconditions present in the environment, and upon the linkage of precondi-
tions with system objectives and implemented technology. As Kling (1980)
notes, computers have no intrinsic impact. Rather, the impact of computing on
organizations results from the joint effects of computing technology and man-
agerial intent:
The "consequences" of computer use are simply the consequences
of purposive action married to computing. As these actions
change, the "consequences" may well change. ... "Impact" [from
computing] happens because of some underlying patterned social
process, and speaking about the "impacts of technology" often dis-
tracts attention from the social processes by which they are
developed, adopted, and used. (Kling, 1980, p. 100).
OA systems can be considered only one factor introduced into an on-
going social process existing prior to implementation. Suchman argues for a
similar perspective is assessing the effects of social programs:
"Thus, any explanation of the success or failure of program [X] to
achieve effect [Y] must take into account the preconditions under
which the [system] is initiated, the events which intervene be-
tween the time the program begins and the time the effects are
produced, and the consequences that follow upon the effects.
Thus no program is an entity unto itself, but must be viewed as
part of an ongoing social system (Suchman, 1977, p. 51).
Measurable and Qualitative Failure
Two sources of potential OA system failure can be identified using Fig-
ure 1. Measurable failure is herein defined as failure of the system (X) to im-
pact the measurable dependent variables (Yns). Qualitative failure is herein
defined as the failure of the measurable dependent variables (Yns) to impact
system objectives (b
p ).
Measurable failure in OA systems can be detected using low variety
evaluation methodologies. Once identified however, measurable failure is not
easily explained, due to the quasi-experimental design used in OA implemen-
tation. Possible explanations include: 1) poor system engineering (i.e. inade-
quate X), 2) preexisting conditions that nullified the impact of the system (a *
X interaction), or, 3) inadequate measurement of dependent variables (i.e.,
Ys). Techniques intended to improve low variety evaluation have been pre-
sented in the systems literature in discussions of experimental design (e.g.
Jarvenpaa, Dickson, and DeSanctis, 1985), systems engineering (e.g. Sprague
and Carlson, 1982), and measurement methodologies (e.g. Miller and Doyle,
1987). Qualitative failure has received considerably less attention in the IS lit-
erature (a notable exception is Mason and Swanson, 1981). Consequently, the
remainder of this article will focus on evaluative techniques for detecting and
describing qualitative failure.
Qualitative failures are summarized metaphorically by Suchman as
medical operations in which "the operation was a success, but the patient died
(Suchman, 1977, p. 51)." Qualitative failures are attributable to a misspecified
or nonexistent relationship between measurable dependent variables and sys-
tem objectives. In such cases, the system may impact the dependent variables
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as predicted (i.e. X --> Yns). However, changes in the dependent variables
(Y
n
s) do not lead to the expected consequences ((i.e. Yns -/-> bps)).
For example, an OA system might reduce the time required to make
decisions, increase the frequency of communications between executives, be
praised by end-users, and still be perceived as decreasing the quality of
organizational communication. Reduced time to make decisions may decrease
decision quality by reducing time needed for deliberation and cogitation
(Zuboff, 1982; Weick, 1985). Increased quantity of communication between
users may be due to decreased quality of interactions (e.g. "I was just calling to
clarify what I thought you said during our last conference call ...") (Kiesler,
1986; Daft, Trevino, and Lengel, 1987). End-users might accept the system to
placate superiors with a vested interest in making the system appear success-
ful (Eveland, 1983). The above scenario provides an OA equivalent of Such-
man's medical metaphor: "No one likes the system, but everyone uses it."
Low variety evaluation methodologies are well-suited to capturing mea-
surable failure, but not qualitative failure. Low variety measures of time to
make a decision, frequency of electronic communications, and user perception
would likely indicate in the above example that the system was a success.
However, high variety methodologies would be required to determine if the
qualitative consequences of the system were desirable (Rice and Rogers 1984;
Rogers, 1986).
RATIONAL DECISIONS TO NOT EVALUATE
The potential for qualitative failure provides a justification for omitting
low variety evaluative approaches of OA in certain circumstances. Since low
variety methodologies are hypothesized to provide data relevant only to as-
sessing measurable failure, then researchers interested in determining quali-
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tative success or failure are well advised to forego low variety evaluations.
Further, evidence from existing OA systems suggests they have provided no
direct cost savings (National Archives and Records Service, 1981; Uttal, 1982;
Bowen, 1986; Business Week, 1988), yet have had a significant impact on
qualitative processes in organizations (Zuboff, 1982; Kiesler, 1986; Sproull and
Kiesler, 1986; Jarvenpaa, 1988). This suggests that OA systems may be prone
to weak or nonexistent causal links between measured dependent variables
and systems objectives (Rice and Rogers, 1984; Rogers, 1986). As a result,
thoughtful consideration of the strength of linkages between measurable de-
pendent variables and systems objectives is relevant to designing effective OA
evaluation.
The Measurement of Intangible Benefits
The extent to which intangible benefits can be captured in measurable
variables is an issue in the IS literature. Some authors argue that aH IS bene-
fits can be assigned quantitative values (Emery, 1982; Wallace, 1984). Others
contend that attempting to quantify intangible benefits leads to a misplaced
focus on the assumptions used for quantification, and thereby distracts from
meaningful evaluation (Knutsen and Nolan, 1974; Keen, 1975; Keen, 1981). In
a discussion of quantifying the benefits resulting from building controls into
accounting IS, an Arthur Young and Co. training manual argues that quanti-
fying intangible benefits is frequently impossible:
Determining the benefits ... to be derived from correcting a
weakness in controls is even more subjective than determining
the costs. In many (if not most) cases, the benefits to be derived
from a given control cannot be measured quantitatively (Arthur
Young and Co., 1980, p. 61).
The principle of incompatibility provides an explanation for the inability
to capture qualitative phenomena using quantitative analysis (Daft and Wigin-
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ton, 1979). By definition, intangible goals contain ambiguity and interde-
pendence between decision factors. The principle of incompatibility suggests
that nontrivial descriptions of intangible goals requires the use of language
that captures these ambiguities and interdependencies. Attempting to mea-
surable intangible, qualitative factors using low variety evaluative methodol-
ogy may result in a caricature, rather than a veracious description, of such fac-
tors. Only high variety evaluation methodologies contain sufficient complexity
to provide meaningful evaluations of intangible benefits.
If system objectives cannot be adequately captured by measurable de-
pendent variables, then undertaking low variety evaluations of OA system in-
curs costs with no corresponding instrumental benefits. Existing evidence sug-
gests that IS practitioners often do not employ low variety evaluation strate-
gies when systems are developed in response to intangible goals (Keen, 1981;
Sprague and Carlson, 1982; Hogue and Watson, 1984). In such cases, under-
taking formal, quantitative evaluation may be undertaken for primarily sym-
bolic rather than instrumental value (March, 1978; Feldman and March, 1981;
Meyer, 1984). For example, a formal cost-benefit analysis of an OA system may
be undertaken primarily as a ritual necessary to projecting an appearance of
rational decision making (Robey and Markus, 1984).
The Goal Trap
The preceding discussion suggests that under certain circumstances,
low variety evaluation may result in incurring costs with only symbolic bene-
fits. However, social intervention research indicates that improperly-applied
low variety evaluation may also result in a redefinition of program objectives.
Deutscher (1977) defines the transformation of program goals resulting from
low variety measurement as the "goal trap."
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The goal trap refers to the potential for the measurement process to
lead to trivialized programs, directed not towards original goals, but rather
towards achieving the measurable "equivalents" of those goals. In terms of
Suchman's model, the dependent variables (Y) may replace and usurp system
objectives (bps). Original, qualitative goals are replaced with the measurable
"equivalents". However, the measurable "equivalents" may be poor surrogates
for the original qualitative objectives of the system.
The goal trap has been recognized in IS. Moore and Chang (1983) de-
scribe cases of premature closure on systems requirements leading to creating
systems designed to address structured, easily solved problems, rather than
more important, but less structured problems. Similarly, Kleijnen observes
that emphasizing quantitative measures of benefits can result in clerical appli-
cations being given priority over less easily justified projects. As a result:
"in more sophisticated applications there is the danger of concen-
trating on the easily quantified factors (say, inventory cost) at the
expense of possibly more important, but more difficult to quan-
tify factors (say, goodwill) (Kleijnen, 1980, p. 9)."
Colton (1978) provides an example of a system that was successful ac-
cording to pre-established measurable criteria, but that could be described as a
qualitative failure. The Kansas City Police Department provided officers with
decision support in locating stolen cars, unpaid parking tickets, and unregis-
tered vehicles. Police Department statistics showed a marked increase in effi-
ciency as a result. The (ex)Chief ultimately regretted the DSS however, since
officers spent more time on these relatively minor offenses, to the exclusion of
messier, less easily quantified cases. Similar dysfunctional consequences from
the use of low variety measures in equivocal, complex environments have been
observed in research on welfare offices and public employment agencies (Blau,
1955), undergraduate education (Becker, Geer, and Hughes, 1968), military
14
strategy (Campbell, 1977), and both Soviet (Granick, 1954) and U.S. (Argyris,
1952) factory production management.
STRATEGIES FOR DESIGNING OA EVALUATION
The exclusive use of low variety evaluation methodologies in environ-
ments characterized by high equivocality creates the potential to ensnare both
evaluator and evaluatee in the goal trap. Such arguments help explain why IS
practitioners frequently omit low variety evaluations of IS. However, these ob-
servations are not helpful irr designing techniques more appropriate to OA
evaluation. Accordingly, this section offers suggestions for increasing the rele-
vance of OA evaluation, and decreasing its potentially destructive by-products.
1. Use Multiple Perspectives For Evaluation
One approach to increasing the relevance of OA evaluation is to use
multiple perspectives in evaluation (Akoka, 1981; Robey and Marcus 1984;
Cooper 1988). Kling (1980) argues that there are two basic theories used to
examine the effects of computing. Weick summarizes these theories as fol-
lows:3
"Systems rationalist perspectives assume consensus on goals rel-
evant to computer use, view efficiency as a predominant value,
focus attention on the user more than on the context in which
the user operates, assume a top-down view of change and im-
plementation, and treat the formal authority structure as an ac-
curate map of the way activities are carried out.
Segmented institutionalist perspectives assume that conflict is
more common than consensus, that definitions of the situation
are multiple, that goals are diverse, that implementation is af-
fected by vested interest groups and power, that relevant social
forms consist of much more than task groups, and that technol-
ogy can take on a variety of meanings (Weick, 1984, p. 118)."
-I
Other authors have presented similar dichotomies using different labels. For example, Boland
(1978) discusses the "traditional" and "alternative" perspectives of rationality in IS design. These
roughly correspond to Kling's systems rationalist and segmented institutionalist perspectives,
respectively.
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Kling's perspectives provide alternative frames for conducting OA eval-
uation. In terms of Suchman's model, multiple evaluative perspectives can be
used to increase both the number of orthogonal dependent variables (Ys), and
the number of observed outcomes (bps). Increasing the pool of unique vari-
ables and observed outcomes makes it less likely that: (1) only predicted con-
sequences will be observed, (2) data will be an artifact of the theoretical per-
spective embraced by the evaluator (Weick, 1979), and (3) evaluation will use
only low variety measures. Consequently, a pragmatic strategy for improving
OA evaluation is to integrate the systems rationalist and segmented institu-
tionalist perspectives in evaluation. Suggestions for accomplishing this inte-
gration follow.
2. Attend to the Unintended
Suchman's model of evaluation (Figure 1) illustrates the complex, in-
terdependent environment in which OA systems are placed. This environment
insures that multiple effects will result from OA implementation. Some of
these effects will be intended; however, many more will be unintended, and
unanticipated by system designers (Rogers, 1983, 1984, 1986). Recent research
confirms that unintended effects result from OA systems. Demonstrated unin-
tended effects include changes in leadership patterns (Strickland, Guild, Bare-
foot, and Paterson, 1978; Zigurs, Poole, and DeSanctis, 1987), altered propen-
sities toward risk (McGuire, Kiesler and Siegel, 1987), interruptions of tradi-
tional feedback processes (Zuboff, 1982), changed communication patterns
(Williams, 1978; Rogers, 1986), altered social relationships (Zuboff, 1982;
Kiesler, 1986; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, and McGuire, 1986), changes in so-
cial status (Rogers, 1986), increases in the quantity of available information
(Zuboff, 1982), and decreases in the number and richness of information
sources (Zuboff, 1982; Weick, 1985; Daft, Lengel, and Trevino, 1987).
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Kiesler (1986) and Rogers (1983, 1986) observe a bias in the evaluation
of new technology towards overestimating the expected improvements in effi-
ciency, and underestimating the unintended social effects. To illustrate, the
elevator was introduced to increase the efficiency of movement in multi-floor
buildings (Kiesler, 1986). However, the elevator enabled skyscrapers and ex-
tremely high population densities. Consequently, an unintended social effect
of elevators is increased superficiality in social contacts, as people work in one
area and live in another. A byproduct of this superficiality is greater alienation
and increased social distance. Such effects from elevators were unpredicted
and unexpected. Given the significant capacity of OA to alter work relation-
ships (Zuboff, 1982; Weick, 1985), long-term social effects are likely to result
from OA systems.
Actively seeking out the unintended effects of OA avoids framing the
evaluation question as a nonsensical null hypothesis that ignores unintended
effects. When evaluating OA systems implemented in complex social systems,
asking, "did anything happen from the OA implementation?" is inane. The
interdependencies present in any meaningful OA implementation insure that
the null hypothesis of "nothing" happening is logically impossible. The more
sensible questions to be answered in evaluating OA systems are, "what is hap-
pening that was intended?" and "what is happening that was not intended?"
(Merton, 1957; Deutscher, 1977).
Reframing the evaluation question as stated above serves two objec-
tives. Changing the temporal form of the question (i.e. from "what happened"
to, "what is happening?") reframes the evaluation of OA systems from a static
evaluation of a past event, into recognition of the on-going, interdependent na-
ture of the social process in which even the evaluator is a party (Pondy, 1977).
Such a perspective aids the evaluator in recognizing that the evaluation pro-
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cess (as well as the evaluation product) is likely to impact perceptions of the
OA system, and may therefore change perceptions of the success or failure of
the system. Dividing the evaluation question into consideration of both the in-
tended and unintended effects of the system further insures that OA evalua-
tion does not exclusively focus on predefined variables that the system was
predicted to impact. The complexity of the social environment of an OA
implementation makes prediction of all effects impossible. However, the un-
predictability of OA system effects does not mean that such effects cannot be
recognized and evaluated ex post.
It is a logical contradiction to suggest that the unanticipated effects of
OA can be predicted. However, explicating and evaluating unintended effects
should be an essential component of OA evaluation. Possible unintended ef-
fects of OA can be obtained from a variety of sources. Existing research in OA
explicates many of the short term unintended consequences of OA (Williams,
1978; Zuboff, 1982; Kiesler, 1986; Er, 1987). Extrapolating from the long-term
effects of prior technological advances, such as the printing press, elevator,
and telephone offer a second source (Kiesler, 1986; Rogers, 1986). Finally, op-
ponents of OA implementation, both within and outside the implementing
organization can identify many potential undesirable consequences of OA
(Salasin, 1973; Rogers, 1984).
3. Triangulate Data Sources
One strategy for increasing the likelihood of capturing unintended ef-
fects is the use of multiple, independent data sources. Many authors have sug-
gested the use of multiple measures as a means for avoiding the goal trap (e.g.
Ridgway, 1981). However, the use of multiple measures is a necessary but
insufficient condition for triangulation in measurement (Webb, Campbell,
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Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966; Isaac and Michael, 1984). The use of multiple,
low variety measures (e.g. a series of survey questions), or multiple measures
within a single perspective (e.g. multiple measures of user satisfaction) does
little to increase evaluative variety. For example, existing data suggests that
low variety measures of user satisfaction are largely redundant (Rushinek and
Rushinek, 1983). •
Table 1 provides a reference source for generating triangulated data. By
choosing one evaluative approach from the upper half of the list, and one from
the lower half, evaluators can avoid the false security of having multiple, con-
firming low variety measures. For example, one evaluative strategy for OA
might be to "go native" and conduct covert field research, but combine this ap-
proach with a user questionnaire. Such an approach would likely provide in-
sights into social relationships and unintended consequences from OA that
would be overlooked by exclusive use of a questionnaire.
4. Evaluate Processes And Input/Output
A second method for triangulating data is to combine input/output
analysis with evaluations of social (Rogers, 1986) and decision processes (Todd
and Benbasat, 1987). OA systems are increasingly designed to impact man-
agerial decision making processes (McLeod and Jones, 1987). Consequently, an
evaluative perspective that focuses solely on input and outputs (e.g. quantifi-
able costs and benefits) is likely to fail to capture much of the impact of OA.
Integrating input-output measures with evaluations of processes offers a
richer, more complete evaluative perspective than can be provided by input-
output analyses alone (Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976; Payne, Braun-
stein, and Carroll, 1978; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, and Kleinmuntz, 1979; Rogers,
1984; Patton, 1987)).
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5. Discover Goals, Don 't Evaluate Them
Recent research suggests that, "organizations are rarely what they pre-
tend to be (Deutscher, 1977, p. 221)." Significant differences often exist in the
formal and informal structures, processes, and goals of organizations (March
and Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1976; Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf, 1978). Managers may
only understand and make sense of events after the events have transpired
(Hirschman, 1967; Weick, 1979). Goals may be left intentionally vague, or even
stated as opposites of desired ends in order to strategically manage prefer-
ences for outcomes (March, 1978; Pascale, 1979). Within IS, rituals may be
used to "... symbolize rationality and signify that the actions taken are not
arbitrary, but rather acceptable within the organization's ideology" (Robey and
Markus, 1984, p. 12). Such examples suggest that OA systems may be con-
structed for reasons other than those stated in a formal information require-
ments analysis. Consequently, the formally stated goals of an OA system may
have little to do with the actual goals of managers, designers, and users.
The loose coupling of formal and actual goals in organizations suggests
that evaluation directed only at measuring the extent to which stated goals
have been met by an OA system will likely miss most of what goes on in
organizations (Deutscher, 1977; Deutscher and Gold, 1979). Actual goals and
unintended consequences are intimately wound into the on-going social mosaic
within which OA is placed. As a result, a major objective of OA evaluation
should be to explicate the goals of organization actors responsible for an OA
system.
Evaluating OA systems from this perspective replaces the task of evalu-
ating the extent to which the system has met its original goals, with the task
of discovering the system's actual goals. Such an approach assumes that users,
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designers, and managers often cannot or will not articulate the actual goals of
OA. In such cases, evaluation becomes similar to investigative journalism
(when actors will not state goals) (Guba, 1981) or participant-observer re-
search (when actors cannot state goals) (Deutscher and Gold, 1979). Either
role requires an evaluative perspective relatively unexplored in IS.
CONCLUSION
The frustration of IS professionals with existing methodologies for OA
evaluation is expressed by a Westinghouse Electric executive responsible for
monitoring the company's use of teleconferencing:
"I can measure how much this video teleconferencing equipment
costs and guess about how much we save in travel expenses when
we apply it, but I haven't the slightest idea how good the decision
are that our people reach when they use it. (Kiesler, 1986, p. 54)"
The principle of incompatibility suggests that accurate and consequen-
tial statements about complex organizational communication systems are not
possible with low variety, single perspective evaluations. Such methodologies
do not contain sufficient complexity to permit description and evaluation of
equivocality management and organizational sense-making processes (Pondy,
1977; Daft & Wiginton, 1979). Rather, effective evaluation in equivocal envi-
ronments requires integrating multiple perspectives, observing the un-
expected, collecting orthogonal measures, measuring processes, discovering
goals, and employing both high and low variety methodology.
This paper began with the observation that, in evaluating the effects of
IS, practitioners rarely practice what researchers preach, and researchers
rarely preach what practitioners practice. Ultimately, the point of this paper is
that both IS evaluation research and practice can be improved by integrating
the seemingly disparate perspectives of practitioners and researchers. IS re-
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search can be improved by greater attention to and observation of existing
practice, unencumbered by existing normative models of evaluation. IS prac-
tice can be improved by experimentation with formal models and theories of
evaluation, leading to improvements in current practice.
The implications of this argument for IS research are more subtle and
profound than may be initially evident. The choice of a methodology for evalu-
ation of OA is tightly bound to issues of theoretical substance. That is, what
evaluators "see" when assessing the effects of technology is largely a function
of what they expect to see (i.e. "believing is seeing," Weick, 1979, p. 135). Re-
searchers using low variety, single perspective evaluative methodology expect
to "see" rational, measurable phenomena that are largely predictable and or-
derly. However, unintended effects, social processes, and goal displacement
and evolution generally lie outside of the rational models and measurements
often prescribed for OA evaluation. As Weick suggests:
"The crux of my concern is that the comfort MIS researchers feel
with rational models, measurement, and order will tempt them
into the following illogic:
1. Every real phenomenon can be measured.
2. If it can't be measured, it's not real.
3. If it can be measured, it's real.
Blunt measures, narrow measures, and nonmeasures poke holes
in this reasoning. Nevertheless, the imagery is seductive. Appli-
cation of this illogic, especially when the issues in technology and
organization are at a formative stage, could make it impossible
for us to learn about this important area (Weick, 1984, p. 129)."
The insights of social intervention research offer an alternative to the
current schism between IS evaluation research and IS evaluation practice.
Further, such methodologies are not new and untested, but rather are the
cumulative result of 30 years of research into social interventions and organi-
zational processes. An old cliche goes, "you can't teach an old dog new tricks."
The important question for OA researchers and evaluators in their decision to
22
apply and adapt the insights of social intervention research is however, "Can
you teach old tricks to a new dog?".
23
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Table 1
Continuum of Evaluative Methodologies
(Adapted from Douglas (1976) and Weick (1984))
Everyday Life/
Social Experience and Thought
1. Conscious Experience
2. Practical Thought and Action
3. Diaries and Memories
4. Travelogues
5. On-Site Field Studies and
Reports
6. Systematic Reflection
7. Philosophical Reflection
Field Research/
Participant Field Research
8. Depth-Probe Field Research
9. Investigative Reporting,
Detective Work
10. Covert Field Research
11. Overt Journalism and Police
Work
12. Overt Field Work
Nonparticipant Field Research 13.
14.
Discussion Research (free-
flowing), In-Depth Interviews
In-Depth Interviews with
Flexible Checklists of
Questions
Controlled Experimental Methods 15. Natural Experiments
16. Preprogrammed Interviews
(with statistical analysis)
17. Official Data and Business
Analysis Reports
18. Judicial Investigations
(operating under rules of
evidence)
19. Panel (test and retest) Studies
20. Laboratory Experiments
21. Questionnaires and Polls
22. Computer Simulation Studies
23. Mathematical and Statistical
Models
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